Better Late Than Never

The Pre-War Generation’s Take on Mass Mobilisation

Guest blog written by H4MOD student team: Harry Giffin, Courtney Bridges, Maria-Johanna Reinstein, Eva Hassid, Caitlin Ayre and Jeremy Roffe.

Recently, the words ‘mobilisation’ and ‘conscription’ have dominated the headlines after Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, emphasised the urgent need to train a ‘citizen army’ for potential conflict. Amid grim warnings from senior military figures across NATO about the looming threat of war with Russia, the call for preparation rings louder and truer than ever. General Sanders underscored a historical truth: wars begin with professionals but end with citizen armies. Having a plan for mobilisation beyond the currently available forces appears to be a critical requirement. But, as we discovered, there is no plan of this kind in the UK. In this blog, we chart our journey as we examined mass mobilisation and its apparent need in today’s uncertain world, and diverse and ever-changing population.

In September, before mobilisation was the subject of much press attention, our team was exploring the issue as a part of our 12-week H4MOD course. We were tasked by the British Army with thinking of a way of preparing and training civilians and reservists in the event of war in Europe. To hone our understanding of the issue, our team conducted 66 interviews, including serving officers and civilian experts in both the UK and abroad. Although weeks have passed since the initial media frenzy, we felt it important to share our thoughts on conscription, having spent the past three months researching the topic and being members of what General Sanders referred to as the “Pre-war Generation”.

Mass Mobilisation student team along with Problem Sponsor Col Douglas Cochran and Industry Mentor Richard King.

A Necessity, Not a Luxury

Throughout our research, it became evident that it is necessary to plan for bringing the UK industry and society to a war-footing if war occurred. Waiting until the brink of war to begin planning would prove to be an expensive mistake. The relative cost of planning for such a hypothetical scenario is much lower than not having planned for it at all, and all of a sudden needing such a plan.

 Rishi Sunak claimed that playing through “hypothetical scenarios” of future wars was “not helpful”. You may be thinking - as the Prime Minister does - that this is all rather far-fetched, but having a plan is a necessary foundation to preparation, quoting President Eisenhower, “plans are nothing; planning is everything”. It is inevitable that no plan will perfectly suit events that have not yet been experienced. However, the British political and defence establishment have the option of either examining all hypothetical scenarios, or they can evade the tough discussions and risk the reality of a war-equivalent of the Covid crisis. Whether or not mass mobilisation will manifest as a reality, failing to plan for this hypothetical scenario, however unlikely, is a luxury Britain cannot afford.

Learning from Experience

There are ample international case studies and experiences to draw upon, which puts policymakers and defence planners in a good position to engage in informed planning for a mass mobilisation scenario. Operation INTERFLEX is just one of the many avenues through which the UK army has been able to practise forging civilians into combat-ready soldiers. However, these soldiers were not brought up overnight, there was extensive planning and logistics involved that needed to be in place before Ukrainian civilians could even begin basic training that takes months. Similarly, extensive planning and preparation would have to take place if the UK needed to mobilise its own civilians.

Beyond Training: A Whole of Government Approach

Training only makes up a small portion of planning for mass mobilisation. Mobilisation is a multifaceted and whole-of-government effort. There is no use in having a great training plan if it is not backed up by solid procurement and industrial capabilities and planning. Highly trained soldiers are of little use if they have no equipment to fight with. Building up a war industry takes years, and therefore certain intelligence triggers must be in place to ensure that the process is initiated at the right time. For such tasks to be undertaken, the right decision-making processes must be in place at the government level. All these efforts rest on the ability to foster public support for societal mobilisation. These endeavours, not unlike a battlespace plan, are interdependent and must be coordinated. This is not something that can be addressed when war is already at our door.

No one wants war, and General Sanders did not suggest that the UK would re-instate conscription and start mobilising tomorrow. However, he did state that this potential scenario is something the political and defence establishment need to consider, because failing to tackle these questions during peacetime, will result in unimaginably painful ramifications if the UK ever needs to go to war. The army possesses a great tactical understanding of the issue of mobilisation. Personnel at the army’s training establishments know exactly how much time, how many instructors, how much equipment, and how many rounds of ammunition are needed to train a fresh recruit. Where the understanding of the problem seems to be lacking, is in how all these tactical aspects fit into a wider plan at the strategic level.

Uncovering a Key Problem: Lack of Ownership

Mass mobilisation during a large-scale conflict seems to be a topic that has fallen through the cracks in the realm of defence planning. Over the course of our research, we found that there was a very high level of interest in the question among army officers, with many of them having given it much thought. However, it seemed like it was not an issue that had been specifically assigned to anyone. The senior officers we spoke to agreed that this was an issue of great importance, yet all of them pointed us to someone else when it came to taking ownership of the question. The lack of ownership of the topic stemmed from two places; firstly, prioritisation of short-term commitments and planning processes already in motion; and secondly, the subject is politically unpalatable, particularly in an election year.

The Way Ahead: A Capability Framework

The first step in preparing a plan is understanding the scale of the task ahead. After months of speaking with security sector representatives and ploughing through available current data and historical examples, we designed the prototype of a capability framework which clearly and visually expressed the capability gap across five identified key pillars: military strength, industrial capacity, people and societal mobilisation, political decision-making and intelligence. In each of these areas, our framework shows where the nation’s capability is now, and where it would need to be to improve the country’s war readiness. This shows how big the gap is, clearly and effectively, as well as demonstrating which areas would require the greatest effort. Additionally, we proposed a senior military or civilian official who should be made accountable for each area, to ensure the issue is no longer ‘someone else’s job’.

As members of the ‘Pre-war Generation’, we are the ones with the most at stake in this debate. Ultimately, the question at hand is not whether the UK should plan for mass mobilisation, but rather whether we can afford not to. All evidence points to an increasing likelihood of a situation arising in which we would have no choice. We believe the old adage rings true: fail to prepare, and you prepare to fail. 

Want to work with us? Contact us at info@commonmission.uk